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Abstract
A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money.
We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed.
We are interested in eÆciency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense
to be dened). We rst show that the cooperative game associated with that problem is
convex: its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness
requirement: no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in
the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare distribution in the core
satises this condition: its marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the
agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.
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1 Introduction
Water is essential to life. Man consumes it for a variety of purposes | from drinking, cooking
and washing to agricultural and industrial uses. Due to population growth and industrial-
ization, demand has tremendously increased. On most of the earth's surface, water has now
become a locally scarce resource. We are interested here in the problem of sharing river
water. This is a challenge of considerable practical importance. Two hundred river basins in
the world are shared: 148 by two countries, 30 by three, 9 by four, and 13 by ve or more
countries (Barret, 1994). While many countries do coordinate their consumptions (Egypt and
Sudan, for instance, signed the Nile treaty, while Mali, Mauritania and Senegal founded the
\Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du euve Senegal"), international disputes do occur.
Two important principles are advocated in such disputes (see, e.g., Kilgour and Dinar, 1996).
The theory of unlimited territorial integrity forbids a country to alter the natural conditions
on its own territory to the disadvantage of a neighboring country. It was put forward by
Egypt to claim the right to the continued and uninterrupted ow of water from the Nile river.
The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty
1
, on the other hand, states that a country has
absolute sovereignty over the area of any river basin on its territory: it may freely dispose
of the water owing within its borders but cannot claim the continued and uninterrupted
ow from upper basin countries. In response to the Nile treaty between Egypt and Sudan,
Ethiopia invoked this doctrine to claim the right to exploit the Nile waters originating on its
territory (Godana, 1985). The two doctrines are in obvious conict, which illustrates well the
tensions at work when sharing a river.
Sharing a resource over which property rights are not well dened is notoriously problem-
atic. The economic theory literature has stressed that decentralized noncooperative behavior
typically leads to ineÆciency. In particular, if agents have free access to the resource and
if their marginal net benets are decreasing and eventually negative, the resource is overex-
ploited in equilibrium: this is the famed \tragedy of the commons" (see Hardin, 1968 and
Ostrom, 1990 for many examples). But sharing river water involves a twist due to the fact
1
Also called the Harmon doctrine because it was rst authoritatively stated by Judson Harmon, attorney-
general of the United States, in a declaration made in 1895 concerning the Rio Grande.
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that agents have unequal access to the resource. It is that twist that interests us.
Consider the case where only two agents (who could be countries) are located along a river
with no tributaries; their preferences over water and money are quasi-linear, and marginal
net benets from water consumption are decreasing but always positive. To keep our point
as simple as possible, suppose also that water is a completely rival good. In equilibrium, the
upstream agent leaves nothing for the consumption of the other: this, of course, is typically
ineÆcient. In a model with more agents and possible tributaries, and as long as water is
not a fully nonrival good, agents located upstream still have a tendency to overconsume. In
order to maximize social welfare, i.e., the sum of all agents' benets, it is often necessary that
upstream agents limit their own consumption so as to increase that of downstream agents
whose marginal benets are higher. Clearly, inducing the upstream agents to do so requires
some compensatory payments.
But exactly what payments? While choosing a water consumption plan determines the
level of social welfare, choosing the compensatory payments determines the distribution of
that welfare. In abstract terms, therefore, the central diÆculty is to agree on a welfare
distribution. (Alternatively, if allocating property rights over the water may lead to eÆciency,
the agents still have to agree on how to distribute these rights: see Section 6). Our purpose
is to propose simple principles to do so. By contrast, the policy-oriented literature on river
water allocation, which is enormous (see, e.g., the numerous references in Dinar et al., 1997),
is primarily concerned with the problem of designing suitable institutions or mechanisms for
sharing water. This is undoubtedly of crucial importance, but it should be kept in mind that
dierent mechanisms generally lead to dierent welfare distributions. We therefore believe
that elementary principles for comparing such distributions are essential guidelines to evaluate
and recommend particular institutional arrangements.
In a nutshell, we contend that a sustainable welfare distribution should be stable and fair.
Stability is understood here in the sense of the core. The location of an agent along the river
determines the quantity of water he controls de facto and, thereby, the welfare he can secure
to himself. In the two-agent case with no tributaries, for instance, the upstream agent can
secure to himself the benet of consuming the total ow while the downstream agent can
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secure nothing. Likewise, the secure welfare of an arbitrary coalition of agents is the highest
welfare it can achieve by allocating to its members the water that they control. A welfare
distribution in the core gives to each coalition at least its secure welfare. We emphasize that
these core constraints stem from the eective power structure, not from a legal one: agents
have no obvious property rights on the river.
Fairness is admittedly a delicate and complex issue. In this paper, we suggest one, fairly
minimal, criterion. Every agent, in the absence of the others, would be able to consume
the full stream of water running through his location, thereby achieving what we call his
aspiration welfare level. Sharing the river involves negative externalities in the precise sense
that it is impossible to guarantee to every agent his aspiration level. We therefore suggest
that everyone should take up a share of these externalities; certainly no one should end up
above his aspiration welfare. Pushing the argument one step further, we dene the aspiration
welfare level of an arbitrary coalition of agents to be the highest welfare it could achieve in
the absence of the others. Our fairness criterion requires that no coalition should enjoy more
than its aspiration welfare.
The main purpose of the paper is to show that the core stability constraints (which we
view as inescapable) and the upper bounds dened by the coalitional aspiration levels (which
we regard as minimal) yield a unique welfare distribution. According to this distribution, an
agent's welfare is just his marginal contribution to the coalition composed of his predecessors
along the river. We briey discuss how this welfare distribution could be implemented.
2 A formal statement of the problem
A river ows through a number of countries, regions or cities, henceforth called agents, whose
set is denoted by N = f1; :::; ng. We identify agents with their location along the river and
number them from upstream to downstream: i < j means that i is upstream from j. We
assume that dierent agents are located at dierent points along the river. If S; T  N; we
write S < T if i < j for every i 2 S and every j 2 T: We denote by minS and maxS,
respectively, the smallest and largest members of S. It will be convenient to dene the
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sets of predecessors and followers of agent i, respectively, by Pi = fj 2 N : j  ig and
Fi = fj 2 N : i  jg; and the sets of his strict predecessors and followers by P
0
i = Pinfig
and F
0
i = Finfig: We often write i instead of fig.
The river picks up volume along its course: the ow at its source, e
1
> 0 , is increased
by the amount e
i
 0 between locations i   1 and i; say, without loss of generality, at i: A
schematic representation is given in Figure 1.
A (possibly composite) perfectly divisible good, that will be called money, is available in
unbounded quantities to perform side-payments.. Agents value money and the water from the
river. Agent i
0
s utility from consuming x
i
units of water and receiving a net money transfer
t
i
is u
i
(x
i
; t
i
) = b
i
(x
i
) + t
i
: We call b
i
: R
+
! R agent i's benet function. It is assumed
to be dierentiable at every x
i
> 0, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. We denote its
derivative by b
0
i
and assume that b
0
i
(x
i
) goes to innity as x
i
tends to 0. As a normalization,
we assume b
i
(0) = 0: The list (N; e; b); where e = (e
1
; :::; e
n
) and b = (b
1
; :::; b
n
); constitutes
our problem.
A consumption plan ( for N) is any vector x 2 R
N
+
: For an arbitrary nonempty coalition
S  N; x
S
2 R
S
+
denotes the restriction of x to S : it is a consumption plan for S. An allocation
is a vector (x; t) = (x
1
; :::; x
n
; t
1
; :::; t
n
) 2 R
N
+
R
N
satisfying the feasibility constraints
X
i2N
t
i
 0; (1)
X
i2Pj
(x
i
  e
i
)  0 for every j 2 N: (2)
It is important to note that the water stream e
i
can only be consumed by the followers of
i: This makes our problem dierent from that of allocating a stock of some standard private
good with the possibility of side-payments.
A welfare distribution is any vector z = (z
1
; :::; z
n
) 2 R
N
which is the utility image of some
allocation (x; t) in the sense that z
i
= b
i
(x
i
) + t
i
for each agent i.
Two important features of the model must be stressed. First, as is clear from the feasibility
constraints (2.2), water is considered here to be a pure private good. In fact, it is to a large
extent a nonrival good. Many forms of consumption by an agent do not destroy the water
and leave its ow, or at least part of it, available for the consumption of downstream agents:
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see Young and Haveman (1985) for a discussion. If water was a pure nonrival good, however,
there would be no consumption sharing problem at all. We therefore focus exclusively on the
rival forms of consumption. This is not to say that the partially nonrival nature of water does
not raise problems, but we ignore them here.
The second feature is that the marginal costs of consumption never exceed the marginal
benets, as reected by the assumption that the b
i
functions are increasing over the whole
nonnegative real line. This assumption is not standard in the literature on common property
resources: the reason, of course, is that the tragedy of the commons arises only if marginal
costs eventually do exceed marginal benets. In our model, however, noncooperative behavior
is ineÆcient even when net benets are always increasing; moreover, the assumption allows
us to focus on the type of ineÆciency that is particular to sharing river water, namely, the
tendency for upstream agents to overconsume relative to downstream agents.
3 EÆciency
Because preferences are quasi-linear, an allocation (x

(N); t

(N)) is (Pareto) eÆcient if and
only if it maximizes the sum of all agents' benets and wastes no money. We call x

(N) an
optimal consumption plan.
This section describes the structure of an optimal consumption plan. In fact, we consider
consumption plans maximizing the total benet of an arbitrary coalition S  N under a
more general set of constraints than just the corresponding feasibility conditions. We state
a number of lemmata concerning such plans, and how they are aected by changes in the
constraints. These lemmata, which are proved in Appendix 1, will be used repeatedly in
Sections 4 and 5.
Let ; 6= S  N and let T  S. Throughout Section 3 and Appendix 1, T and S are xed
and all agents under consideration are understood to be members of S: We therefore often
simplify notations by dropping reference to S; for instance, i  j means that i 2 Pj \ S; and
P
i
x
i
means
P
i2S
x
i
:
Notation. Fix two numbers ; ! that are admissible in the sense that 0   and 0 
6
! 
P
i
e
i
+ : Fix also a consumption plan x
T
that is feasible for T in S given ; !) in the
sense that there exists a consumption plan x for S satisfying the constraints
x
T
= x
T
(3)
and
X
ij
(x
i
  e
i
)    
j
! (4)
for every j 2 S; where 
j
= 1 if j = maxS and 
j
= 0 otherwise. Denote by x

(S;; !; x
T
) any
consumption plan for S that maximizes
P
i
b
i
(x
i
) subject to those constraints. Extending our
terminology, we call such a plan optimal. If T = ;, we alleviate notations and write x

(S;; !)
instead of x

(S;; !; x
;
): If  = ! = 0; we write x

(S; x
T
) instead of x

(S; 0; 0; x
T
) and x

(S)
instead of x

(S; 0; 0; x
;
):
The parameter  may be viewed as an extra ow made available at minS for possible
consumption by any member of S while ! is interpreted as a minimal ow that must be left
over by S at maxS: For any admissible ; ! and any feasible x
T
; our assumptions guarantee
that the optimal plan x

(S;; !; x
T
) is unique. It is described in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. If
P
ij
(x

i
(S;; !; x
T
)   e
i
) =    
j
! for some j , let S

be the set of
predecessors in S of the largest such j ; set S

= ; otherwise. Then, i) SnT  S

and ii) if
S

6= ;, there is a partition fS

k
g
k=i;:::;K
of S

and a list f
k
g
k=1;:::;K
of positive numbers such
that
S

k
< S

k
0
and 
k
 
k
0
whenever k < k
0
; (5)
b
0
i
(x

i
(S;; !; x
T
)) = 
k
for every i 2 S

k
nT and every k = 1; :::K; and (6)
X
i2S

k
(x

i
(S;; !; x
T
)  e
i
) =   
maxS

k
! for every k = 1; :::; K: (7)
According to Lemma 1, the marginal benets of the agents in SnT decrease weakly as
we move downstream. Moreover, if two agents in SnT; say, j < j
00
, have dierent marginal
benets, some constraint must be binding between them: there exists j
0
2 S; j  j
0
< j
00
;
such that
P
ij
0
(x
i
  e
i
) = :
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In our next three lemmata, we formulate useful monotonicity | or solidarity| properties
of optimal plans. We use the vector inequality notation ; <; : The rst two results assert
that the consumption of no member of S at an optimal plan can be reduced if more water is
made available at minS or if less water must be left over at maxS:
Lemma 2. For any admissible ; !;and any feasible x
T
;   
0
) x

(S;; !; x
T
)
 x

(S;
0
; !; x
T
):
Lemma 3. For any admissible ; !
0
; and any feasible x
T
; 0  !  !
0
) x

(S;; !; x
T
) 
x

(S;; !
0
; x
T
):
These lemmata can be used to show that decreasing the consumption of the members of
T cannot reduce the consumption of anyone in SnT: This is the content of our next lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose T 6= S. For any admissible ; ! and any feasible x
T
; 0  y
T

x
T
) x

SnT
(S;; !; y
T
)  x

SnT
(S;; !; x
T
):
With these results in hand, we are now ready to analyze the cooperative game generated
by our problem.
4 Core stability: lower bounds on welfare
Following Greenberg and Weber (1986), we call a coalition S consecutive if k 2 S whenever
i; j 2 S and i < k < j: If S is consecutive, we call
v(S) =
X
i2S
b
i
(x

i
(S)) (8)
the secure benet of S: Now, every coalition T admits a unique coarsest partition into con-
secutive components: denote it T: The secure benet of T obtains by summing up the secure
benets of its consecutive components,
v(T ) =
X
S2T
v(S); (9)
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where v(S) is given by (4.1). Coalition T cannot secure more than (4.2) because any water
left over by one of its connected components cannot be guaranteed for the consumption of
any other component. We say that v is the game generated by the problem (N; e; b): It is an
example of what Greenberg and Weber (1986, 1993) call a \consecutive" game: one in which
only consecutive coalitions generate surplus. We insist that no property rights exist in the
problem (N; e; b) and that the game v is an expression of the natural, eective |but not
legal| distribution of power among agents.
A (welfare) distribution z = (z
1
; :::; z
n
) is a core distribution if
P
i2S
z
i
 v(S) for every
S  N: An allocation that does not generate a core distribution would be unstable: some
coalition could object to it on the basis that it can secure on its own a higher welfare to
all its members. Fortunately, core distributions do exist in the present context. This is
because the game v generated by our problem is convex in the sense of Shapley (1971), i.e.,
v(S)  v(Sni)  v(T )  v(Tni) whenever i 2 S  T  N: Informally, a convex game is one
where cooperation exhibits increasing marginal returns. To prove convexity of v, the following
lemma, whose straightforward proof is in Appendix 2, will be useful.
Lemma 5. If S; T are two coalitions such that S < T; then i) x

(T )  x

T
(S [ T ) and ii)
x

S
(S [ T )  x

(S):
We are now ready to establish our claim. To put it in perspective, it might be useful to
recall that an arbitrary consecutive game is not necessarily convex.
Proposition. The game v generated by the problem (N; e; b) is convex.
Proof. Fix i 2 S  T  N: Let R be the (unique, consecutive) coalition in the partition
S containing i and let Q be the unique coalition in T containing i. Note that R  Q: Given
(4.2), we need only check that
v(R)  v(Rni)  v(Q)  v(Qni): (10)
Let R
P
:= R \ P
0
i; R
F
:= R \ F
0
i; and dene Q
P
and Q
F
similarly. Note that v(Rni) =
v(R
P
) + v(R
F
) and v(Qni) = v(Q
P
) + v(Q
F
): Moreover, R
P
 Q
P
; R
F
 Q
F
; and R;R
P
; R
F
as well as Q;Q
P
; Q
F
are all consecutive.
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Step 1. We claim that
v(R
P
[ i)  v(R
P
)  v(Q
P
[ i)  v(Q
P
); (11)
v(R
F
[ i)  v(R
F
)  v(Q
F
[ i)  v(Q
F
): (12)
To prove (4.4), let d
j
= x

j
(R
P
) x

j
(R
P
[ i) for each j 2 R
P
: This quantity is nonnegative
because of Lemma 5. By denition,
v(R
P
[ i)  v(R
P
) =
X
j2R
P
[b
j
(x

j
(R
P
)  d
j
)  b
j
(x

j
(R
P
))] + b
i
(e
i
+
X
j2R
P
d
j
): (13)
Next, dene the following consumption plan for the consecutive coalition Q
P
[ i :
x
0
j
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
x

j
(Q
P
) if j 2 Q
P
nR
P
;
x

j
(Q
P
)  d
j
if j 2 R
P
;
e
i
+
P
j2R
P
d
j
if j = i:
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>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
;
By denition of the increments d
j
; this consumption plan meets the same feasibility constraints
as x

(Q
P
[ i); note in particular that x
0
j
 0 for every j 2 R
P
because Lemma 5 guarantees
that x

j
(Q
P
)  x

j
(R
P
): Therefore,
v(Q
P
[ i)  v(Q
P
) 
X
j2R
P
[b
j
(x

j
(Q
P
)  d
j
)  b
j
(x

j
(Q
P
))] + b
i
(e
i
+
X
j2R
P
d
j
): (14)
Moreover, by concavity of the benet functions, b
j
(x

j
(R
P
)  d
j
)  b
j
(x

j
(R
P
))  b
j
(x

j
(Q
P
) 
d
j
)  b
j
(x

j
(Q
P
))  0 for every j 2 R
P
: Taking these inequalities into account, (4.6) and (4.7)
imply (4.4). The same argument, mutatis mutandis, establishes (4.5).
Step 2. By repeated application of (4.4) and (4.5), we obtain v(R
P
[ Q
F
[ i)   v(R
P
[
R
F
[ i)  v(Q
F
[ i)  v(R
F
[ i) and v(Q
P
[Q
F
[ i)  v(R
P
[Q
F
[ i)  v(Q
P
[ i)  v(R
P
[ i):
Therefore,
v(Q)  v(R)
= [v(Q
P
[Q
F
[ i)  v(R
P
[Q
F
[ i)] + [v(R
P
[Q
F
[ i)  v(R
P
[ R
F
[ i)]
 [v(Q
P
[ i)  v(R
P
[ i)] + [v(Q
F
[ i)  v(R
F
[ i)]
 v(Q
P
)  v(R
P
) + v(Q
F
)  v(R
F
)
= v(Qni)  v(Rni);
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where the second inequality holds again because of (4.4) and (4.5). We are done. 2
The above proposition is important because the core of a convex game has a simple and
well-known structure. If  is a bijection from N to N , the so-called marginal contribution
vector z

is the welfare distribution assigning to each agent his marginal contribution to the
coalition made up of his strict predecessors in the ordering generated by ; i.e., z

i
= v(fj :
(j)  (i)g)  v(fj : (j) < (i)g) for every i 2 N: Shapley (1971) has shown that the core
of a convex game is the convex hull of all the marginal contribution vectors.
Two particular welfare distributions occupying distinguished positions in the core of a
convex game are the Shapley value and the Dutta-Ray (1989) constrained egalitarian welfare
distribution. The former is the barycenter of the core; the latter is the unique maximal element
of the Lorenz partial order in the core. While these two welfare distributions are certainly of
interest in our problem, we emphasize that they are dened from the sole knowledge of the
game v: This, we believe, is a shortcoming. If the game v generated by the problem (N; e; b) is
all that counts from the stability viewpoint of the core, it does not contain all the information
that is relevant to a complete analysis. We contend, in particular, that the problem (N; e; b)
generates upper bounds on welfare that are very appealing from the viewpoint of fairness.
5 Fairness: upper bounds on welfare
In the absence of the other agents, agent i would be able to consume the full stream of water
running through his location, thereby enjoying his aspiration welfare
w(i) = b
i
(
X
j2Pi
e
j
):
Of course, the welfare distribution (w(1); :::; w(n)) is not feasible:
P
i2N
w(i) > v(N) as soon
as N contains at least two agents. In Moulin's (1990a) terms, the problem (N; e; b) exhibits
negative group externalities. In such a context, it is natural to ask that everyone takes up a
share of these externalities; certainly no one should end up above his aspiration welfare.
This argument generalizes to coalitions in a very natural way. The aspiration welfare of
an arbitrary coalition S is the highest welfare it could achieve in the absence of NnS: It is
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obtained by choosing a consumption plan x
S
maximizing
P
i2S
b
i
(x
i
) subject to the constraints
X
j2Pi\S
x
j

X
j2Pi
e
j
for every i 2 S: (15)
This problem has a unique solution, which we denote by x

(S): The aspiration welfare of S
is thus
w(S) =
X
i2S
b
i
(x

i
(S))
and we say that a welfare distribution z satises the aspiration upper bounds if
P
i2S
z
i
 w(S)
for every S  N:
Combining these fairness upper bounds with the core lower bounds yields a remarkable
result. It turns out that only one welfare distribution passes both tests: it is the downstream
incremental distribution z

dened by z

i
= v(Pi)  v(P
0
i) for each i 2 N: Notice that since
the game v is convex, z

admits a simple characterization: among all core distributions, it is
the one that lexicographically maximizes the welfare of agents n; n  1; :::; 2; 1:
Theorem. The downstream incremental distribution z

is the unique core distribution
satisfying the aspiration upper bounds.
We will use an additional piece of notation and a lemma. If ; 6= S  N; T  S, and
x
T
is feasible for T in S, dene v(S; x
T
) =
P
i2S
b
i
(x

i
(S; x
T
)), where we recall that x

(S; x
T
)
maximizes the total benet to S subject to allocating x
T
to T .
Lemma 6. Let s; q 2 N; s < q; and dene S := Ps; Q := Pq: Let ; 6= T  S; and let x
T
be feasible for T in S: Then, 0  y
T
 x
T
) v(S; y
T
)  v(S; x
T
)  v(Q; y
T
)  v(Q; x
T
):
The proof of this fact may be found in Appendix 2. We are now ready to establish our
theorem.
Proof of the Theorem. The argument is divided into three steps.
Step 1: The downstream incremental distribution z

is a core distribution.
The distribution z

is just the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering
1; :::; n: That vector is a core distribution because v is convex, as asserted by the Proposition
in Section 4.
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Step 2: If a core distribution z satises the aspiration upper bounds, then z = z

:
Key to the proof is the straightforward observation that v(Pi) = w(Pi) for every i 2 N:
Since this is true for i = 1; the core inequalities and the aspiration upper bounds immediately
imply that z
1
= z

1
: Next, proceed inductively. Fix j < n and suppose z
i
= z

i
for all i  j:
Since v(P (j + 1)) = w(P (j + 1)); the core constraints and the aspiration upper bounds force
P
i2P (j+1)
z
i
= v(P (j+1)); hence z
j+1
= v(P (j +1)) 
P
i2Pj
z
i
: By the induction hypothesis,
P
i2Pj
z
i
=
P
i2Pj
z

i
= v(Pj): Therefore, z
j+1
= v(P (j + 1))  v(Pj) = z

j+1
; as desired.
Step 3: z

satises the aspiration upper bounds.
Fix an arbitrary coalition S; write PS for P maxS; and compute
X
j2S
z

j
=
X
j2S
[v(Pj)  v(P
0
j)]
=
X
j2S
[v(Pj; x

PjnS
(Pj))  v(P
0
j)]

X
j2S
[v(Pj; x

PjnS
(Pj))  v(P
0
j; x

PjnS
(Pj))]

X
j2S
[v(Pj; x

PjnS
(PS))  v(P
0
j; x

PjnS
(PS))]:
The last inequality holds by Lemma 6 because Lemma 5 guarantees that x

PjnS
(PS) 
x

PjnS
(Pj) for every j 2 S:Writing
e
x(Pj) := x

(Pj; x

PjnS
(PS)) and
e
x(P
0
j) := x

(P
0
j; x

PjnS
(PS))
whenever j 2 S; we obtain
X
j2S
z

j

X
j2S
[
X
i2P
0
j\S
[b
i
(
e
x
i
(Pj))  b
i
(
e
x
i
(P
0
j))] + b
j
(
e
x
j
(Pj))]
=
X
i2S
[
X
j2F
0
i\S
[b
i
(
e
x
i
(Pj))  b
i
(
e
x
i
(P
0
j))] + b
i
(
e
x
i
(Pi))]:
For every i 2 S; every j 2 F
0
i \ S, and every k 2 F
0
j \ S, Lemma 5 guarantees that
e
x
i
(P
0
k) 
e
x
i
(Pj) 
e
x
i
(P
0
j) 
e
x
i
(Pi). Therefore,
P
j2F
0
i\S
[
e
x
i
(Pj) 
e
x
i
(P
0
j)] +
e
x
i
(Pi)  0:
By concavity of b
i
;
X
j2F
0
i\S
[b
i
(
e
x
i
(Pj))  b
i
(
e
x
i
(P
0
j))] + b
i
(
e
x
i
(Pi))
 b
i
(
X
j2F
0
i\S
[
e
x
i
(Pj) 
e
x
i
(P
0
j)] +
e
x
i
(Pi)):
Writing
y
i
:=
X
j2F
0
i\S
[
e
x
i
(Pj) 
e
x
i
(P
0
j)] +
e
x
i
(Pi);
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we therefore get
X
j2S
z

j

X
i2S
b
i
(y
i
):
We complete the proof by showing that
P
i2S
b
i
(y
i
)  w(S): To do so, it is certainly enough
to show that
X
i2Pj\S
(y
i
  e
i
)  0 for every j 2 S: (16)
Fix j 2 S: Compute
X
i2Pj\S
y
i
=
X
i2Pj\S
X
k2F
0
i\Pj\S
[
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k)]
+
X
i2Pj\S
X
k2F
0
j\S
[
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k)] +
X
i2Pj\S
e
x
i
(Pi)
=
X
k2Pj\S
X
i2P
0
k\S
[
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k)]
+
X
i2Pj\S
X
k2F
0
j\S
[
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k)] +
X
i2Pj\S
e
x
i
(Pi);
so that nally
X
i2Pj\S
y
i
=
X
k2Pj\S
[
X
i2Pk\S
e
x
i
(Pk) 
X
i2P
0
k\S
e
x
i
(P
0
k)]
+
X
i2Pj\S
X
k2F
0
j\S
[
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k)]: (17)
For every k 2 S; we have by denition of
e
x(Pk) and
e
x(P
0
k);
X
i2Pk\S
e
x
i
(Pk) +
X
i2PknS
x

i
(PS) =
X
i2Pk
e
i
;
X
i2P
0
k\S
e
x
i
(P
0
k) +
X
i2P
0
knS
x

i
(PS) =
X
i2P
0
k
e
i
:
Subtracting the second of these equations from the rst and replacing in (5.3) yields
X
i2Pj\S
y
i
=
X
k2Pj\S
e
k
+
X
i2Pj\S
X
k2F
0
j\S
[
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k)] 
X
k2Pj\S
e
k
;
where the inequality holds because
e
x
i
(Pk) 
e
x
i
(P
0
k) whenever i 2 Pj \ S and k 2 F
0
j \ S
because of Lemma 5. Since j was arbitrary, this establishes (5.2) and nishes the proof. 2
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6 Decentralization and implementation
We argued so far that an optimal water consumption plan must be accompanied by appropri-
ate side-payments in order to lead to a sustainable welfare distribution. We further suggested
that a sustainable welfare distribution should be stable and fair. We showed how the core
stability constraints and the aspiration upper bounds pin down the so-called downstream in-
cremental distribution. That approach is quite abstract and very much cooperative in spirit:
it seeks to determine what general agreements have a better chance to be acceptable to all
parties.
The focus of the current section, by contrast, is procedural and noncooperative. We briey
discuss various institutional arrangements or mechanisms in which the decentralized behavior
of the concerned agents could lead to the downstream incremental welfare distribution. We
distinguish two forms of decentralized behavior: myopic competitive behavior is assumed in
the rst subsection, sophisticated strategic behavior in the second. As most of the discussion
below involves familiar concepts, we will deliberately keep the presentation somewhat infor-
mal. We refer the reader to Moore (1992) for an introduction to the theory of implementation
under complete information.
6.1 Decentralization by markets
A simple procedure to avoid the ineÆcient use of river waters consists in assigning explicit
property rights to the concerned agents and set up markets where they can exchange these
rights. This is done in practice: in the irrigation service area of Alicante in Spain, for instance,
agents are endowed with volumetric water rights from specic sources which they may then
exchange in a public auction held every Sunday morning. Trade is enforced by an executive
commission elected by the members (Ostrom, 1990, Reidinger, 1994).
To formalize such a procedure in the context of our model, dene an array  = (
ij
)
i;j2N
,
where 
ij
is the proportion of tributary j's water owned by agent i: thus, 0  
ij
 1
for all i; j and
P
i2N

ij
= 1 for every j. The list (N; e; b;) generates an (n + 1)-good
exchange economy in the following way. Water from each tributary j is considered as a
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separate good; agent i's endowment in that good is 
ij
e
j
and endowments in money are
arbitrary. If x
ij
denotes i's consumption of water from tributary j; x
i
:= (x
ij
)
j2N
, and t
i
is
the net money transfer received, agent i's preferences are represented by the utility function
U
i
(x
i
; t
i
) = b
i
(
P
j2Pi
x
ij
) + t
i
. An allocation for that exchange economy is a list (x; t), where
x = (x
ij
)
i;j2N
and t = (t
i
)
i2N
satisfy the constraints that
P
i2N
x
ij
 e
j
for every j 2 N and
P
i2N
t
i
 0:
A (competitive) equilibrium for (N; e; b;) is dened in the obvious way. Normalizing
money endowments to zero, it is straightforward to check that i's utility at equilibrium is
z
i
(N; e; b;) = b
i
(x

i
)  b
0
i
(x

i
)x

i
+
X
j2N
b
0
j
(x

j
)
ij
e
j
;
where x

is the optimal water consumption plan in the problem (N; e; b) discussed in Section
3. We may now search for an array of property rights  that would generate the downstream
incremental welfare distribution. Writing the latter z

(N; e; b) to emphasize its dependence
upon the problem at hand, we need to solve the system
z
i
(N; e; b;) = z

i
(N; e; b) for all i 2 N;
X
i2N

ij
= 1 for all j 2 N:
This is a linear system in . While it may have several solutions, the important observation
is that they will typically change with the preference prole b: the simplest way to see this is
to note that z

1
(N; e; b) = b
1
(e
1
) does not depend on (b
j
)
j 6=1
while z
1
(N; e; b;) generally does.
It is therefore necessary to know the agents' preferences in order to design property rights
that would generate the downstream incremental welfare distribution through competitive
exchange. In particular, endowing agents with equal property rights, a solution that is central
in the literature on the classical fair-division problem (Varian, 1974, Champsaur and Laroque,
1981) and important in the standard formulation of the tragedy of the commons (Moulin,
1990b), would not always lead to the downstream incremental distribution. It is easy to see
that the welfare distribution at the competitive equilibrium from equal endowments may in
fact violate the core constraints of Section 4 as well as the aspiration upper bounds of Section
5.
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6.2 Implementation through game forms
When the number of agents is small, competitive behavior is unlikely. Implementation in
the game-theoretic sense becomes important. To coordinate international river management,
countries often join institutions or sign treaties that specify negotiation rules on various mat-
ters. For instance, the \principe d'approbation des Etats" included in the treaty founding the
\Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du euve Senegal" states that a country cannot change
the water ow without the consent of all members (Ambec, 1997). Such rules sometimes come
close to explicit game forms.
It is easy to implement in subgame perfect equilibrium the downstream incremental welfare
distribution | or, more precisely, the rule that associates with each conceivable preference
prole b the corresponding downstream incremental distribution z

(N; e; b). As we already
pointed out, that distribution lexicographically maximizes the welfare of agents n; n 1; :::; 2; 1
subject to the core constraints. This suggests an extensive game form in which n; n 1; :::; 2; 1
are successively allowed to make oers. If s 2 N , call an allocation for Ps any vector
(x; t) 2 R
Ps
+
R
Ps
such that
P
i2Ps
t
i
 0 and
P
i2Pj
(x
i
 e
i
)  0 for every j 2 Ps. In the rst
stage, agent n proposes an allocation for Pn = N . Agents n  1; :::; 1 are successively asked
whether they agree with the proposed allocation. If they all do, the allocation is enforced.
Otherwise, agent n gets the bundle (x
n
; t
n
) = (e
n
; 0): Agent n   1 may now propose an
allocation for P (n  1); which in turn needs the unanimous successive approval of n  2; :::; 1
to be enforced; otherwise n 1 gets (e
n 1
; 0). If the last stage of this game form is ever reached,
agent 2 proposes an allocation for P2 which is enforced if agent 1 agrees; otherwise, 2 gets
(e
2
; 0) and 1 gets (e
1
; 0): Straightforward backwards induction shows that every subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game generated by this game form and an arbitrary preference
prole b yields the downstream incremental welfare distribution z

(N; e; b):
7 Concluding comments
The specicity of the problem analyzed in this paper stems from the nature of the feasibility
constraints at play: agents are ordered and water can only be transferred downstream. We
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showed how this extremely rigid structure suggests powerful guidelines for collective choices.
Other interesting allocation problems involve highly structured feasibility constraints rem-
iniscent of inequalities (2.2). Intertemporal models, for instance, where commodities cannot
be consumed before they are produced, share some essential features with our setup. More
generally, networks of exchange where not all participants can meet are of a similar nature. We
believe that the theory of collective choices has much to gain from a systematic exploitation
of the structure of the feasibility constraints in such environments.
Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Write x

(S;; !; x
T
) = x. To prove i), note rst that the inclusion
SnT  S

is trivial if S

= S. Otherwise, let j
1
; :::; j
L
= maxS denote the members of SnS

;
with j
l
< j
l
0
whenever l < l
0
. Since (3.2) is a strict inequality for j = maxS and since b
maxS
is strictly increasing, it must be that maxS 2 T: Repeating this argument, we conclude,
successively, that j
L
; :::; j
1
are all members of T and, therefore, SnT  S

:
To prove ii), assume now that S

is nonempty. Denoting by 
j
the multiplier associated
with constraint (3.2) in the maximization problem dening x; the rst-order conditions yield
b
0
j
(x
j
) =
X
ij

i
for all j 2 SnT; (18)

j
[
X
ij
(x
i
  e
i
)   + 
j
!] = 0 for all j 2 S; (19)

j
 0 for all j 2 S: (20)
Let j

1
; :::; j

K
be the agents j for which (3.2) is an equality; there is at least one since S

6= ;.
Dene 
1
=
P
jj

1

j
; S

1
= fj 2 S : j  j
1
g; and, if 1 < K; dene 
k
=
P
jj

k

j
and
S

k
= fj 2 S : j
k 1
 j  j
k
g whenever 1 < k  K: Conditions (3.5) are then satised.
Moreover, conditions (9.1) and (9.2) imply (3.4) because 
j
= 0 for every j 6= j

1
; :::; j

K
:
Finally, conditions (9.1) and (9.3) guarantee (3.3). 2
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Proof of Lemma 2. Write x

(S;; !; x
T
) = x; x

(S;
0
; !; x
T
) = y; and recall that all
agents under consideration belong to S. If y = x; we are done. Otherwise, consider all the
agents i 2 S such that y
i
6= x
i
: Number them i
1
; :::; i
L
; with i
l
< i
l
0
whenever l < l
0
: By
optimality of y,
X
ii
1
(y
i
  x
i
)  0: (21)
We claim that
y
i
1
  x
i
1
> 0: (22)
Suppose that the opposite strict inequality holds. Let j be the smallest follower of i
1
such
that y
j
  x
j
> 0, which exists because of (9.4). Observe that
X
ik
(y
i
  e
i
) <
X
ik
(x
i
  e
i
)    
0
whenever i
1
 k < j: (23)
Dene y
"
by y
"
i
1
= y
i
1
+ "; y
"
j
= y
j
  "; and y
"
i
= y
i
for all i 6= i
1
; j: The inequalities in (9.6)
guarantee that, for suÆciently small " > 0; y
"
satises the constraints of the maximization
problem dening y; namely,
P
ik
(y
"
i
 e
i
)  
0
whenever k < maxS;
P
imaxS
(y
"
i
 e
i
)  
0
 !;
and y
"
T
= x
T
: By optimality of x , however, b
0
i
1
(x
i
1
)  b
0
j
(x
j
) and, since b
i
1
and b
j
are strictly
concave, b
0
i
1
(y
i
1
) > b
0
i
1
(x
i
1
) and b
0
j
(x
j
) > b
0
j
(y
j
), hence, b
0
i
1
(y
i
1
) > b
0
j
(y
j
): For " small enough,
therefore,
P
i
[b
i
(y
"
i
)  b
i
(y
i
)] > 0; contradicting the optimality of y. We have proved (9.5).
Suppose now, contrary to the claim, that y
i
l
  x
i
l
< 0 for some l  2: Choose l minimal.
By optimality of y and strict concavity of b
i
l 1
and b
i
l
; we know that b
0
i
l 1
(x
i
l 1
) > b
0
i
l
(x
i
l
): By
Lemma 1, there is some k; i
l 1
 k < i
l
; such that the constraint on x at k is binding, i.e.,
P
ik
(x
i
  e
i
) = : It follows that
P
i>k
(x
i
  e
i
) =  ! and therefore
X
ii
l
(y
i
  x
i
)  0 (24)
since
P
ii
l
(y
i
  x
i
) =
P
i>k
(y
i
  x
i
) =
P
i>k
(y
i
  e
i
) + ! =
P
ik
(e
i
  y
i
) + 
0
  
0
+ 
0
= 0:
Now, mimicking the argument showing that (9.4) implies (9.5), we obtain from (9.7) that
y
i
l
  x
i
l
> 0; which is the desired contradiction. 2
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Proof of Lemma 3. Write now x

(S;; !; x
T
) = x and x

(S;; !
0
; x
T
) = y: If y = x; we
are done. Otherwise, consider all agents i 2 S such that y
i
6= x
i
: Number them i
1
; :::; i
L
; with
i
l
< i
l
0
whenever l < l
0
: By optimality of x;
X
ii
L
(y
i
  x
i
)  0: (25)
We claim that
y
i
L
  x
i
L
< 0: (26)
Suppose the converse strict inequality holds. Let j be the largest predecessor of i
L
such
that y
j
  x
j
< 0, which exists because of (9.8). Since
P
ij
(y
i
  x
i
) < 0, we know that
P
ij
(y
i
  e
i
) < : Letting j
0
be the smallest strict follower of j in SnT , it follows that
X
ik
(y
i
  e
i
) <  whenever j  k < j
0
: (27)
By optimality of x and strict concavity of b
j
and b
j
0
however, we know that b
0
j
(y
j
) > b
0
j
0
(y
j
0
),
which, by Lemma 1, contradicts (9.10). We have proved (9.9).
Suppose now, contrary to the claim, that y
i
l
  x
i
l
> 0 for some l  L   1: Choose l
maximal. By optimality of y and strict concavity of b
i
l
and b
i
l+1
, b
0
i
l
(x
i
l
) > b
0
i
l+1
(x
i
l+1
): By
Lemma 1, there is some k; i
l
 k < i
l+1
; such that
P
ik
(x
i
  e
i
) = : It follows that
X
ii
l
(y
i
  x
i
)  0 (28)
since
P
ii
l
(y
i
  x
i
) =
P
ik
(y
i
  x
i
) =
P
ik
(y
i
  e
i
) 
P
ik
(x
i
  e
i
)     = 0: Mimicking
the argument showing that (9.8) implies (9.9), we obtain from (9.11) that y
i
l
  x
i
l
< 0; a
contradiction. 2
Proof of Lemma 4. Let T; ; !; x
T
and y
T
satisfy the assumptions of the lemma. Write
x

(S;; !; x
T
) = x and x

(S;; !; y
T
) = y: The case where y
T
= x
T
being straightforward,
assume that y
T
< x
T
(recall our notation for vector inequalities). Since x
T
may be transformed
into y
T
coordinate by coordinate, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the two vectors
dier in only one coordinate, say, t. Since all agents are assumed to be members of S, we
further abuse our notation slightly and write P
0
t = fi 2 S : i < tg and F
0
t = fi 2 S : i > tg:
20
Dene !
t
=  +
P
i<t
(e
i
  x
i
) and !
0
t
=  +
P
i<t
(e
i
  y
i
); with the convention that
a summation over the empty set is zero. Also dene 
t
=  +
P
it
(e
i
  x
i
) and 
0
t
=
 +
P
it
(e
i
  y
i
); so that 
0
t
  
t
= (!
0
t
  !
t
) + (x
t
  y
t
):
Step 1: Proving that !
0
t
 !
t
:
Suppose, by contradiction, that !
0
t
> !
t
: This has three consequences. First,
P
0
tnT 6= ;; (29)
Second, using the notation introduced at the beginning of the section,
x
P
0
t
= x

(P
0
t; ; !
t
; x
T\P
0
t
) and y
P
0
t
= x

(P
0
t;; !
0
t
; x
T\P
0
t
) (since y
T\P
0
t
= x
T\P
0
t
). It
follows from Lemma 3 that
y
P
0
t
< x
P
0
t
; (30)
where the inequality is strict because (9.12) guarantees that the consumption of at least one
member of P
0
t is not xed. Third, 
0
t
> 
t
. It follows from Lemma 2 that
y
F
0
t
 x
F
0
t
(31)
whenever F
0
t is nonempty since in that case x
F
0
t
= x

(F
0
t;
t
; !; x
T\F
0
t
) and y
F
0
t
=
x

(F
0
t;
0
t
; !; x
T\F
0
t
):
If either F
0
t is empty or (9.14) is an equality, dene the consumption plan y
0
for S by
letting y
0
= y
t
and y
0
i
= x
i
for every i 6= t: Note that y
0
satises all the constraints of the
maximization problem whose solution is y: Yet, y
0
> y; a contradiction.
If F
0
t is nonempty and (9.14) is not an equality, pick any i < t such y
i
< x
i
and the
smallest j > t such that y
j
> x
j
: Observe that
X
kl
(y
k
  e
k
) <
X
kl
(x
k
  e
k
)   whenever i  l < j: (32)
Dene y
"
by y
"
i
= y
i
+ "; y
"
j
= y
j
  "; and y
"
k
= y
k
if k 6= i; j: In view of (9.15), we can choose
" > 0 small enough to ensure that y
"
satises all the constraints of the maximization problem
whose solution is y: But by optimality of x and strict concavity of the benet functions,
we know that b
0
i
(y
i
) > b
0
j
(y
j
): Therefore
P
k
[b
k
(y
"
k
)   b
k
(y
k
)] > 0 for suÆciently small ",
contradicting optimality of y and completing Step 1.
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Step 2. Proving that 
0
t
 
t
:
Suppose, again by way of contradiction, that 
0
t
< 
t
: Note, rst, that this inequality
implies (9.12). Second, because of Lemma 2,
y
F
0
t
 x
F
0
t
(33)
whenever F
0
t is nonempty. Third, !
t
> !
0
t
and therefore, by Lemma 3,
y
P
0
t
> x
P
0
t
: (34)
If either F
0
t is empty or (9.16) is an equality, choose any i < t such that y
i
> x
i
: We claim
that
X
kl
(x
k
  e
k
) <   
l
! whenever i  l: (35)
To see why this is true, note that if i  l < t; (9.17) implies that
P
kl
(x
k
  e
k
) <
P
kl
(y
k
 
e
k
)  : Next, if t  l;
P
kl
(x
k
 e
k
) = ( 
t
)+
P
t<kl
(x
k
 e
k
) < ( 
0
t
)+
P
t<kl
(x
k
 e
k
) =
P
kl
(y
k
  e
k
)     
l
!: Because of (9.18), the consumption plan x
"
dened by x
"
i
= x
i
+ "
and x
"
k
= x
k
for k 6= i satises the constraints of the problem whose solution is x when " is
small enough, a contradiction.
If F
0
t is nonempty and (9.16) is not an equality, pick any i < t such y
i
> x
i
and the
smallest j > t such that y
j
< x
j
: Using virtually the same argument as to prove (9.18), we
obtain
X
kl
(x
k
  e
k
) <  whenever i  l < j: (36)
Dene x
"
by x
"
i
= x
i
+ "; x
"
j
= x
j
  "; and x
"
k
= x
k
if k 6= i; j: In view of (9.19), we can choose
" > 0 small enough to ensure that x
"
satises all the constraints of the maximization problem
whose solution is x: But by optimality of y and strict concavity of the benet functions,
we know that b
0
i
(x
i
) > b
0
j
(x
j
): Therefore
P
k
[b
k
(x
"
k
)   b
k
(x
Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 5. Let S; T be two coalitions such that S < T: Let  :=
P
i2T
[x

i
(S [
T ) x

i
(T )]:Optimality requires   0: Furthermore, x

T
(S[T ) = x

(T ;; 0) while x

S
(S[T ) =
x

(S; 0; ): Invoking Lemmata 2 and 3 completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 6. Let S;Q; T; x
T
and y
T
satisfy the assumptions of the lemma. The
case where y
T
= x
T
being trivial, assume y
T
< x
T
. For every i 2 SnT;
d
i
:= x

i
(S; y
t
)  x

i
(S; x
t
)  0 (37)
because of Lemma 4, and
x

i
(S; x
T
)  x

i
(Q; x
T
)  0; (38)
as is easily seen by dening ! =
P
i2S
(e
i
  x

i
(Q; x
T
)); noting that x

(S; x
T
) = x

(S; 0; 0; x
T
);
x

S
(Q; x
T
) = x

(S; 0; !; x
T
); and applying Lemma 3.
By strict concavity of the benet functions, (9.20) and (9.21) imply that b
i
(x

i
(S; y
T
))  
b
i
(x

i
(S; x
T
))  b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
) + d
i
)  b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
)) for every i 2 SnT . Therefore,
v(S; y
T
)  v(S; x
T
)
=
X
i2S
[b
i
(x

i
(S; y
T
))  b
i
(x

i
(S; x
T
))]

X
i2T
[b
i
(y
i
)  b
i
(x
i
)] +
X
i2SnT
[b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
) + d
i
)  b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
))]
= [
X
i2T
b
i
(y
i
) +
X
i2SnT
b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
) + d
i
) +
X
i2QnS
b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
))]
 [
X
i2T
b
i
(x
i
) +
X
i2SnT
b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
)) +
X
i2QnS
b
i
(x

i
(Q; x
T
))]:
The second bracket is just v(Q; x
T
): To complete the proof, we need only show that the rst
bracket does not exceed v(Q; y
T
): We show that the consumption plan
x
i
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
y
i
if i 2 T;
x

i
(Q; x
T
) + d
i
if i 2 SnT;
x

i
(Q; x
T
) if i 2 QnS
9
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
;
(39)
23
satises the constraints of the maximization problem whose solution is x

(Q; y
T
): Since x
T
=
y
T
; all we have to check is that
X
ij
(x
i
  e
i
)  0 for every j 2 Q: (40)
If j 2 S, combining (9.22) with (9.20) and (9.21) yields that
P
ij
x
i

P
ij
x

i
(S; y
T
) 
P
ij
e
i
: If j 2 QnS, we get
P
ij
x
i
=
P
i2T
y
i
+
P
i2SnT
[x

i
(S; y
T
) x

i
(S; x
T
)]+
P
i2PjnT
x

i
(Q; x
T
)

P
i2T
x
i
+
P
i2PjnT
x

i
(Q; x
T
) =
P
ij
x

i
(Q; x
T
) 
P
ij
e
i
: 2
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